Chapter V
Guidelines for Interpretation
of the WTO Covered Agreements
OUTLINE
I Introduction
II Application of Arts. 31, 32 of the Vienna Convention
III WTO Rules on Conflicts: Effective Interpretation
IV The Status of Legitimate Expectations in Interpretation
I Introduction
According to Art. 11 of the DSU, the panel's role is to “make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. In the previous chapter, we have examined the general standard of review labeled as “an objective assessment” regarding “the facts of the case”; clearly, for panels to fulfil appropriately their functions as designated in Art. 11 of the DSU, it is also indiscerptible to make such an objective assessment of “the applicability and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. Therefore, the interpretation issue of the covered agreements arises. In this section, the author will scrutinize guidelines for interpretation applied under the WTO jurisprudence.
To resolve a particular dispute, before addressing the parties' arguments in detail, it is clearly necessary and appropriate to clarify the general issues concerning the interpretation of the relevant provisions and their application to the parties' claims. However, the complex nature of the covered agreements has given rise to difficulties in interpretation.
As noted previously, GATT/WTO jurisprudence should not be viewed in isolation from general principles developed in international law or most jurisdictions; and according to Art. 3.2 of the DSU, panels are bound by the “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” in their examination of the covered agreements. A number of recent adopted reports have repeatedly referred, as interpretative guidelines, to “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” as embodied in the text of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘Vienna Convention’), especially in its Arts. 31, 32. It is in accordance with these rules of treaty interpretation that panels or the Appellate Body have frequently examined the WTO provisions at issue, on the basis of the ordinary meaning of the terms of those provisions in their context, in the light of the object and purpose of the covered agreements and the WTO Agreement. These Vienna Convention articles provide as follows:
“Art. 31: General Rule of Interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.
Art. 32 Supplementary Means of Interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”
II Application of Arts. 31, 32 of the Vienna Convention
Pursuant to Art. 31.1 of the Vienna Convention, the duty of a treaty interpreter is to determine the meaning of a term in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the term in its context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. As noted by the Appellate Body in its Report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages (DS8/DS10/DS11), “Article 31 of provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive process: ‘interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty’. The provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions”. And in US ? Shrimps (DS58), the Appellate Body accordingly states: “A treaty interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular provision to be interpreted. It is in the words constituting that provision, read in their context, that the object and purpose of the states parties to the treaty must first be sought. Where the meaning imparted by the text itself is equivocal or inconclusive, or where confirmation of the correctness of the reading of the text itself is desired, light from the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole may usefully be sought.”
More specifically, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules that: “Text, context and object-and-purpose correspond to well established textual, systemic and teleological methodologies of treaty interpretation, all of which typically come into play when interpreting complex provisions in multilateral treaties. For pragmatic reasons the normal usage, and we will follow this usage, is to start the interpretation from the ordinary meaning of the ‘raw’ text of the relevant treaty provisions and then seek to construe it in its context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose. However, the elements referred to in Article 31 - text, context and object-and-purpose as well as good faith - are to be viewed as one holistic rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order. Context and object-and-purpose may often appear simply to confirm an interpretation seemingly derived from the ‘raw’ text. In reality it is always some context, even if unstated, that determines which meaning is to be taken as ‘ordinary’ and frequently it is impossible to give meaning, even ‘ordinary meaning’, without looking also at object-and-purpose. As noted by the Appellate Body: ‘Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive process: 'interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty'’. It adds, however, that ‘[t]he provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions’.” 1
In sum, as noted by the Panel in Canada-Automotive Industry (DS139/DS142), “understanding of these rules of interpretation is that, even though the text of a term is the starting-point for any interpretation, the meaning of a term cannot be found exclusively in that text; in seeking the meaning of a term, we also have to take account of its context and to consider the text of the term in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention explicitly refers to the ‘ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their [the terms'] context and in the light of its [the treaty's] object and purpose’. The three elements referred to in Article 31 - text, context and object and purpose - are to be viewed as one integrated rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order. Of course, context and object and purpose may simply confirm the textual meaning of a term. In many cases, however, it is impossible to give meaning, even ‘ordinary meaning’, without looking also at the context and/or object and purpose”. 2
With regard to Art. 32 of the Vienna Convention, it is repeatedly ruled that, “[t]he application of these rules in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention will usually allow a treaty interpreter to establish the meaning of a term. However, if after applying Article 31 the meaning of the term remains ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, Article 32 allows a treaty interpreter to have recourse to ‘... supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion’. With regard to 'the circumstances of [the] conclusion' of a treaty, this permits, in appropriate cases, the examination of the historical background against which the treaty was negotiated.” 3
As a whole, under the WTO jurisprudence, with regard to the dispute among the parties over the appropriate legal analysis to be applied, as general principles or guidelines of interpretation, it is often begun with Art. 3.2 of the DSU. To go further, as noted by the Panel in Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, “the ‘customary rules of interpretation of public international law’ are those incorporated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). GATT panels have previously interpreted the GATT in accordance with the VCLT. The Panel noted that Article 3:2 DSU in fact codifies this previously-established practice”. Consequently, “the Panel concluded that the starting point of an interpretation of an international treaty, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in accordance with Article 31 VCLT, is the wording of the treaty. The wording should be interpreted in its context and in the light of the object and the purpose of the treaty as a whole and subsequent practice and agreements should be taken into account. Recourse to supplementary means of interpretation should be made exceptionally only under the conditions specified in Article 32 VCLT”. 4
In short, it is may be the case that, it is generally considered that the fundamental rules of treaty interpretation set out in Arts. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention have attained the status of rules of customary international law. In recent years, the jurisprudence of the Appellate Body and WTO panels has become one of the richest sources from which to receive guidance on their application.
III WTO Rules on Conflicts: Effective Interpretation
The Panel Report on Turkey-Textile and Clothing Products (DS34) states concerning the conflicts issue that: 5
“As a general principle, WTO obligations are cumulative and Members must comply with all of them at all times unless there is a formal ‘conflict’ between them. This flows from the fact that the WTO Agreement is a ‘Single Undertaking’. On the definition of conflict, it should be noted that: ‘… a conflict of law-making treaties arises only where simultaneous compliance with the obligations of different instruments is impossible. ... There is no conflict if the obligations of one instrument are stricter than, but not incompatible with, those of another, or if it is possible to comply with the obligations of one instrument by refraining from exercising a privilege or discretion accorded by another’.
This principle, also referred to by Japan in its third party submission, is in conformity with the public international law presumption against conflicts which was applied by the Appellate Body in Canada - Periodicals and in EC - Bananas III, when dealing with potential overlapping coverage of GATT 1994 and GATS, and by the panel in Indonesia - Autos, in respect of the provisions of Article III of GATT, the TRIMs Agreement and the SCM Agreement. In Guatemala - Cement, the Appellate Body when discussing the possibility of conflicts between the provisions of the Anti-dumping Agreement and the DSU, stated: ‘A special or additional provision should only be found to prevail over a provision of the DSU in a situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to a violation of the other provision, that is, in the case of a conflict between them’.
We recall the Panel's finding in Indonesia - Autos, a dispute where Indonesia was arguing that the measures under examination were subsidies and therefore the SCM Agreement being lex specialis, was the only ‘applicable law’ (to the exclusion of other WTO provisions): ‘14.28 In considering Indonesia's defence that there is a general conflict between the provisions of the SCM Agreement and those of Article III of GATT, and consequently that the SCM Agreement is the only applicable law, we recall first that in public international law there is a presumption against conflict. This presumption is especially relevant in the WTO context since all WTO agreements, including GATT 1994 which was modified by Understandings when judged necessary, were negotiated at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum. In this context we recall the principle of effective interpretation pursuant to which all provisions of a treaty (and in the WTO system all agreements) must be given meaning, using the ordinary meaning of words.’
In light of this general principle, we will consider whether Article XXIV authorizes measures which Articles XI and XIII of GATT and Article 2.4 of the ATC otherwise prohibit. In view of the presumption against conflicts, as recognized by panels and the Appellate Body, we bear in mind that to the extent possible, any interpretation of these provisions that would lead to a conflict between them should be avoided.”
It is clearly implied by the ruling above that, in the WTO system, any interpretation of the covered agreements that would lead to a conflict between them should be avoided. In this respect, as to WTO rules of conflicts, in the context that all WTO agreements were negotiated “at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum”, the principle of effective interpretation is recalled. What a principle is it?
As ruled by the Panel in Japan-Alcoholic Beverage (DS8/DS10/DS11), effective interpretation is a principle “whereby all provisions of a treaty must be, to the extent possible, given their full meaning so that parties to such a treaty can enforce their rights and obligations effectively…. this principle of interpretation prevents [the panel] from reaching a conclusion on the claims … or the defense …, or on the related provisions invoked by the parties, that would lead to a denial of either party's rights or obligations.” 6 This ruling is upheld by the Appellate Body when ruling that, “[a] fundamental tenet of treaty interpretation flowing from the general rule of interpretation set out in Article 31 is the principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat). In United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, we noted that ‘[o]ne of the corollaries of the ‘general rule of interpretation’ in the Vienna Convention is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility’.” 7
关于印发《寿险公司非现场监管规程（试行）》的通知
中国保险监督管理委员会
关于印发《寿险公司非现场监管规程（试行）》的通知
各保监局：
为规范寿险公司非现场监管工作，提高非现场监管工作的质量和效率，建立健全寿险公司非现场监管体系，我会研究制定了《寿险公司非现场监管规程（试行）》，现印发给你们。请各保监局根据实际情况，在非现场监管工作中组织试用，认真总结试行经验。
风险监测摘要、风险评估摘要、分类监管摘要等非现场监管分析报告的具体报送要求另行通知。
二○○六年一月十日
寿险公司非现场监管规程（试行）
第一章 总则
第一条 为规范寿险公司非现场监管工作，提高非现场监管工作的质量和效率，建立健全寿险公司非现场监管体系，依据《中华人民共和国保险法》、《保险公司管理规定》和其他相关法律、法规，制定本规程。
第二条 寿险公司非现场监管是指监管部门在采集、分析、处理寿险公司相关信息的基础上，监测、评估寿险公司风险状况，进行异动预警和分类监管的过程。
本规程所称监管部门是指中国保险监督管理委员会（以下简称中国保监会）及其派出机构。
本规程所称寿险公司包括法人机构及其分支机构。本规程所称寿险公司法人机构是指在中国境内经中国保监会批准设立，并依法登记注册的人寿保险公司；本规程所称寿险公司分支机构限于寿险公司法人机构依法设立的省级（含直辖市、计划单列市）分公司和地市级中心支公司。
外国寿险公司分公司视为寿险公司法人机构。
第三条 实施非现场监管工作，应遵循以下原则：
（一）风险监管原则。实施非现场监管工作应以风险监管为核心，持续识别、监测、评估寿险公司的风险，进行异动预警和分类监管，促进寿险公司持续健康发展。
（二）法人监管原则。实施非现场监管工作应以寿险公司法人机构为主要监管对象，强化法人责任，将分支机构非现场监管结果纳入法人机构非现场监管体系。
（三）审慎监管原则。实施非现场监管工作应有效监测和评估寿险公司存在的风险，审慎采取相应监管措施。
（四）协调监管原则。实施非现场监管工作应与其他金融监管机构、社会监督机构、社会中介机构建立信息共享机制与协调合作关系，以整合监管资源，提高监管效率。
（五）监管一致性原则。实施非现场监管工作应设定统一的非现场监管工作目标，建立统一的工作流程和工作标准，确保非现场监管实施与监督的一致性。
第四条 寿险公司非现场监管包括信息收集与整理、风险监测与评估、分类监管、信息归档与管理四个阶段。
第二章 信息收集与整理
第五条 监管部门应根据非现场监管的需要，全面收集反映寿险公司经营和风险状况的信息，包括数据信息和非数据信息。
第六条 监管部门应充分利用中国保险统计信息系统等各种信息渠道，逐步建立健全寿险公司非现场监管信息收集体系。
第七条 监管部门应充分利用已要求寿险公司报送的各种信息进行非现场监管。对于其他需要寿险公司报送的信息，中国保监会应发布明确的非现场监管信息采集要求，确定信息报送的时间、方式、内容、频率和保密要求。
监管部门应督促寿险公司建立非现场监管信息报送制度。寿险公司应对所报送信息的完整性、真实性、准确性和及时性负责。
监管部门认为必要时可要求寿险公司提供经会计师事务所、精算师事务所等社会中介机构审计或鉴证的资料。
第八条 监管部门应将日常监管中收集的现场检查信息、行政处罚信息、调研信息、信访投诉信息、高管人员信息等用于非现场监管。
第九条 监管部门应关注新闻媒体、独立评级机构等社会监督机构发布的寿险公司的相关信息，以及社会公众对寿险公司的评价等相关信息。对于可利用的重要信息，监管部门应在核实后用于非现场监管。
第十条 监管部门在监测与评估寿险公司风险状况时，应按照审慎监管的原则，对发现的寿险公司可能存在的风险或经营管理中可能存在的问题予以确认和核实。
确认和核实的方式包括询问、要求提供补充材料、走访被监管机构、约见会谈等。
第十一条 监管部门可以通过函件、传真、电子邮件的形式要求寿险公司相关人员对有关问题进行答复。
第十二条 监管部门要求寿险公司提供补充材料的，应发出《非现场监管信息报送通知书》（格式参见附件四之一），要求寿险公司就相关问题做出说明。
第十三条 监管部门走访寿险公司应坚持双人走访（至少两人）的原则，走访结束应当制作《非现场监管走访要情》（格式参见附件四之二），《非现场监管走访要情》应经寿险公司盖章确认。
第十四条 监管部门要求约见会谈，应发出《约见寿险公司高级管理人员谈话通知书》（格式参见附件四之三）。会谈结束应制作《非现场监管会谈记录》（格式参见附件四之四），《非现场监管会谈记录》应经寿险公司盖章确认。
第三章 风险监测与评估
第十五条 监管部门应及时利用收集整理的非现场监管信息，对寿险公司业务风险进行监测、预警，对寿险公司法人机构及其分支机构的综合风险状况进行分析、评估。
第十六条 监管部门应对寿险公司业务风险实施季度监测，对寿险公司综合风险状况进行年度评级。
第十七条 监管部门应对寿险公司的业务风险点进行识别，并建立业务风险监测指标体系，通过对业务指标的监测，实现异动预警。寿险公司业务风险监测包括指标监测、异动预警、异常原因分析、编制风险监测摘要四个阶段。
第十八条 寿险公司业务风险监测指标包括收入类、支出类、营销管理类、结构类四类指标（业务风险监测指标及监测方法参见附件一）。
第十九条 监管部门应对寿险行业的系统性异动情况和各寿险公司的个体性异动情况进行监测，并根据系统性异动分析和个体性异动分析的结果，对异常公司及其异常指标进行预警。
第二十条 监管部门应根据日常监管获取的信息对异动预警情况进行专业判断，对认为可能确实存在风险的异动情况进一步收集信息，分析指标异常的原因。
第二十一条 监管部门应编制风险监测摘要，反映指标的异动情况，揭示指标异常的原因及反映的问题，提出监管意见。
第二十二条 监管部门应针对寿险公司法人机构和分支机构的不同情况，各有侧重地进行风险分析和评估。寿险公司风险评估包括潜在风险水平评估、风险管理能力评估、确定综合风险等级、形成风险评估摘要四个阶段。
第二十三条 监管部门应分别对寿险公司法人机构和分支机构的潜在风险因素进行识别，通过定量分析与定性分析，确定每一潜在风险因素的单项潜在风险水平以及在此基础上加权汇总后得到的总体潜在风险水平，划分单项及总体潜在风险水平等级。
寿险公司法人机构的潜在风险因素包括资产风险、负债风险、资产负债匹配风险和管理风险（具体评估要素和评分标准参见附件二）。寿险公司分支机构的潜在风险因素包括业务风险和管理风险（具体评估要素和评分标准参见附件三）。
单项及总体潜在风险水平等级分为：高、中、低三个级别。
第二十四条 监管部门应针对寿险公司法人机构和分支机构的不同风险管理职能，通过定性分析，确定单项风险管理能力以及在此基础上加权汇总后的总体风险管理能力，划分单项及总体风险管理能力的等级。（评估要素和评分标准参见附件二、附件三）。
风险管理能力等级分为：良好、一般、欠佳三个级别。
第二十五条 监管部门应根据寿险公司单项/总体潜在风险水平等级和单项/总体风险管理能力等级，按照下表所列的规则分别确定单项/总体综合风险等级。
单项/总体综合风险等级分为：很高、高、中、低四个级别。
单项/总体风险管理能力等级 单项/总体潜在风险水平等级
低 中 高
单项/总体综合风险等级
良好 低 低 中
一般 低 中 高
欠佳 中 高 很高
监管部门应将寿险公司本年度总体综合风险等级和前一年度总体综合风险等级进行比较，确定总体综合风险等级的变化方向。
总体综合风险等级的变化方向包括：下降、稳定、上升三个方向。
第二十六条 监管部门在评估寿险公司法人机构的风险状况时，应对资本和盈余充足性状况进行评价并划分等级，据此调整寿险公司法人机构总体综合风险等级。
资本和盈余充足性状况等级分为：合格、不合格。当资本和盈余充足性状况等级为合格时，总体综合风险等级维持不变；当资本和盈余充足性状况等级为不合格时，总体综合风险等级上升一级。
第二十七条 监管部门应编制风险评估摘要，反映寿险公司在评估期间内的运营状况、财务状况、潜在风险状况和风险管理状况等。
风险评估摘要的主要内容应该包括：
（一）经营总体情况及评估期内经营管理发生的重要事项，如：股权变动、高级管理人员调整、组织架构重组、重大诉讼案件、重要投资决策等；
（二）存在的主要风险及潜在风险水平评级情况；
（三）风险管理的薄弱环节及风险管理能力评级情况；
（四）综合风险评级及其变化方向；
（五）上一年度监管部门发现的问题及其改进情况；
（六）监管意见和建议；
（七）非现场监管人员认为应当提示或讨论的其他问题。
第二十八条 中国保监会应根据市场变化、行业发展等情况对监测指标、评估要素及标准等进行调整。
第四章 分类监管
第二十九条 监管部门应根据寿险公司的总体综合风险等级制定下一年度监管计划，实施分类监管。监管计划应包括下一年度对各寿险公司进行非现场监管与现场检查的频度、力度、范围和重点，以及监管部门拟采取的其他监管措施。
第三十条 对总体综合风险等级为“低”的寿险公司，监管部门无须采取特别的监管措施，实施日常的非现场监管和常规的阶段性现场检查。
第三十一条 对总体综合风险等级为“中”的寿险公司，监管部门应在实施日常监管的同时，进行有限度的监管。可采取以下监管措施：
（一）进行风险提示，指出寿险公司存在的风险点及风险管理的薄弱环节，要求其予以关注、加以改进，并限期提出整改方案；
（二）针对寿险公司存在风险的领域进行现场检查。
第三十二条 对总体综合风险等级为“高”的寿险公司，监管部门应在实施日常监管的同时，进行严格的监管。可采取以下监管措施：
（一）约见寿险公司高级管理人员；
（二）要求公司提出整改方案，限期改善风险状况、提高风险管理水平；
（三）对总体综合风险等级为“高”的寿险公司分支机构，应将其存在的问题通报寿险公司法人机构；
（四）增加现场检查频率，加大现场检查力度，对寿险公司存在风险的领域重点进行现场检查；
（五）提高非现场监管信息报送的详细程度。
第三十三条 对总体综合风险等级为“很高”的寿险公司，监管部门应在实施日常监管的同时，进行严厉的监管。除采取第三十二条所列措施外，还可采取以下监管措施：
（一）通报董事会和股东大会；
（二）要求聘请合格会计师事务所对公司提供的非现场监管信息进行鉴证；
（三）根据需要采取其他必要的监管措施。
第三十四条 中国保监会可以部分或全部向社会公布非现场监管结果，以强化公众监督和市场约束，促进寿险公司自律管理机制的形成。
第三十五条 监管部门应编制分类监管摘要。分类监管摘要的主要内容应包括当年监管措施的实施情况、实施效果及存在的不足等。
第五章 信息归档与管理
第三十六条 监管部门应建立非现场监管信息档案。非现场监管信息档案包括：寿险公司报送的各类信息、关于寿险公司的社会信息、与寿险公司的函件往来、走访要情、会谈记录、风险监测摘要、风险评估摘要、分类监管摘要、相关请示和领导批示等。
第三十七条 监管部门应建立完善的非现场监管信息档案保管、查询和保密制度。
第三十八条 从事非现场监管的工作人员对非现场监管信息负有保密义务。未经中国保监会允许，不得擅自对外披露。
本条所称非现场监管信息主要包括：
（一）寿险公司报送的所有数据信息；
（二）寿险公司报送的非数据信息；
（三）监管部门对寿险公司进行非现场监管形成的风险监测摘要、风险评估摘要、分类监管摘要等信息；
（四）寿险公司的经营规划、业务创新等内部信息；
（五）上市寿险公司尚未公告的董事会决议等决策信息；
（六）其他可能对寿险公司经营造成不利影响的信息。
第六章 非现场监管工作的监督与管理
第三十九条 中国保监会负责寿险公司法人机构的非现场监管工作。根据工作需要，中国保监会可授权派出机构对辖区内的寿险公司法人机构进行非现场监管。
中国保监会派出机构负责对辖区内的寿险公司分支机构进行非现场监管及根据授权对辖区内的寿险公司法人机构进行非现场监管。
中国保监会认为必要时，可以对寿险公司分支机构进行非现场监管。
第四十条 各派出机构应按要求向中国保监会报送寿险公司分支机构风险监测摘要、风险评估摘要、分类监管摘要及其他分析报告，中国保监会应及时向各派出机构通报寿险公司法人机构非现场监管的有关信息。
第四十一条 中国保监会应建立非现场监管工作评价制度，对派出机构寿险公司非现场监管工作的效率和质量进行评价。
寿险公司非现场监管工作的评价内容包括：信息采集的及时性、信息分析的合理性和准确性、监管信息档案的完整性、监管措施的可行性和非现场监管的有效性。
第七章 附则
第四十二条 健康保险公司、养老保险公司非现场监管参照本规程执行。
第四十三条 开业未满三年的寿险公司不适用本规程。
第四十四条 本规程由中国保监会负责解释和修订。
第四十五条 本规程自发布之日起实施。
附件1：寿险公司业务风险监测体系
附件1之附表：寿险公司业务风险监测体系之附表
附件2：寿险公司法人机构风险评估体系
附件3：寿险公司分支机构风险评估体系
附件4：寿险公司非现场监管文书格式
附件下载:
http://www.circ.gov.cn/policy/list_detail.asp?Auto_ID=268
